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Sickness absence tends to be negatively correlated with unemployment. This may suggest disciplining effects of 
unemployment but may also reflect changes in the composition of the labour force. A panel of Norwegian 
register data for the years 1990-1995 is used to analyse sickness absences lasting more than two weeks. We 
estimate fixed effects models of the probability of absence and the number of days on sick leave conditional on 
absence. The county unemployment rate is found to affect the probability of absence negatively. When 
restricting the sample to workers who are present in the whole sample period, the negative relationship between 
absence and unemployment remains. The evidence on duration goes in the same direction. This indicates that the 
revealed procyclical variation in sickness absence is not driven by changes in the composition of the labour 
force.   
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1.  Introduction 
Rising absence rates, implying productivity losses as well as increased public expenditures, 
are a source of public debate and concern. Whereas it is common to relate the level of 
absences to the generosity of the sickness and disability insurance systems, changes in 
absences are often explained by the development of the labour market. In this paper we focus 
on what seems to be an empirical regularity in several countries: Sickness absence tends to be 
negatively correlated with the unemployment rate, i.e., when the unemployment rate declines, 
absence increases. However, it is not clear what explains this pattern. It may be explained by 
individual costs of absences when unemployment changes, or alternatively by the 
composition of the labour force which varies over the business cycle. 
Typically sickness and disability insurance are organised either as collective 
arrangements on the workplace or as social insurance, thus reducing adverse selection 
problems. As these arrangements have improved income security in the developed world, the 
last 20-30 years have seen an increasing take-up of sickness and disability insurance. This 
trend has led to questions whether generous insurance not only compensate for sickness and 
disability but also induce such outcomes. Countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
Germany have initiated changes in the sick payment schemes that reduce the economic 
compensation to be received during sick leaves. Available studies indicate that changes in the 
compensation ratios do affect absence behaviour. As indicated, it is less clear what explains a 
procyclical development of absence rates for a given insurance system and compensation 
level. 
Sickness absence can b e costly for the workers in three ways. Firstly, if the 
replacement ratio is less than 100%, there is a direct loss of income for a worker when absent. 
Secondly, there are individual costs of absences due to risk of loosing the job if the absence is 
related to shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Barmby et al., 1994), primarily considered   2
relevant for short-term absences, and commonly used as an explanation for a negative 
correlation between absence and the unemployment rate. Thirdly, there may be individual 
costs from absences that affect long-term sickness spells as well. Depending on how absences 
affect profitability, firm survival, and wage and career development, each worker will to 
varying degrees internalise costs of absences. Specifically, costs of absences representing a 
threat to the firm is more likely to be internalised by the insider workers in periods of high 
unemployment than in periods of low unemployment, thus inducing a procyclical pattern also 
in the long-term absence behaviour. When labour market conditions are good or improving, 
and unemployment is low, the insider workers may have more frequent and longer absences 
since their unemployment risk is very low. The two latter explanations both give reasons why 
absences may be negatively related to unemployment, a phenomenon which is confirmed in 
several studies including Leigh (1985), Kenyon and Dawkins (1989), Drago and Wooden 
(1992), Johansson and Palme (1996), Thalmaier (1999), Dyrstad and Ose (2001), Arai and 
Thoursie (2001).  
Alternatively, the negative relation between absence rates and unemployment may be 
due to labour force composition effects from changes in labour demand. Employers may wish 
to screen workers, and if possible offer jobs first to those with the best experience rating and 
favourable absence records. When labour is scarce, however, also “marginal” workers who 
are more prone to be absent, e.g. due to poor health conditions or social problems, are offered 
jobs. Note also that the objectives of an active labour market policy  may include efforts to 
mitigate marginalisation and temporary as well as permanent expulsion from the labour force. 
Relevant measures involve labour market training and assistance in finding a job. The policy 
is aimed at those who become unemployed as well as those who have not succeeded in 
establishing themselves in the labour market. If some of these individuals are more prone to   3
absence for health or other reasons, increasing absence rates may be an adverse side effect of 
the active labour market policy.  
In addition to disciplining and labour force composition effects, there is a third 
hypothesis to explain the association between absence and unemployment. Booming periods 
may put strains on workers, thereby causing health problems and sickness absence. Studies 
that relate absence to working conditions tend to find a connection between psychosocial 
conditions, stress and physical working conditions on the one hand, and absence on the other. 
However, it is hard to find studies providing evidence that variation in absence behaviour is 
caused by changes in working conditions over the business cycle. 
This paper considers Norway, which has a very generous sick leave scheme as part of 
a mandatory social insurance system. Expenditures associated with the Norwegian sick leave 
scheme are significant, in the order of 2.5% of GDP. In 1999 the National Insurance 
Administration’s sick pay expenditures were 18.8 billion NOK, a 13% increase from the 
previous year.
1 Compared to the other Nordic countries, in 1990 Norwegian sickness absence 
rates were the second largest, after Sweden. Contrary to Norway, Sweden reduced the 
compensation ratio and introduced a qualifying period in the early nineties, and in 1998, the 
absence rate in Norway was the largest in the Nordic countries (NOSOSCO 2000). In the present 
study, w e analyse individual level register data from a 10% sample of the labour force 
covering the period 1990-95. The data include sickness absences reimbursed by social 
insurance, i.e. lasting more than two weeks, in addition to quite extensive individual 
background information. Our strategy is first to establish whether there is a negative effect of 
the unemployment rate on these long-time sickness absences. If that is the case, we 
investigate whether the effect is due to changes in labour force composition by analysing a 
sub-sample of stable workers.   4
The next section provides some institutional details and an overview of the data. 
Section 3 gives a short account of our empirical approach. Section 4 reports the empirical 
results, and section 5 contains concludes. 
 
2. Data and institutional background 
Norwegian sickness insurance is mandatory and regulated by law, covering all employees who 
have been with the same employer for at least two weeks. Once this requirement is met, coverage 
is 100 per cent from the first day, but with an upper limit of 6G, where G is the basic unit used 
in the pension system (NOK 39 230 in 1995). However, most large firms and the public sector 
will compensate the workers earning above the insurance ceiling, so that the 100% 
replacement rate is relevant for the bulk of the work force. A medical certificate is necessary 
for absences lasting more than three days. For sickness spells lasting more than eight weeks the 
physician is obliged to provide a m ore detailed certificate to the Social Insurance authorities, 
stating diagnosis and a prognosis assessment. The first 16 days (14 days until 1998) are paid by 
the employer, the employer period, whereas the remaining period is paid by social insurance, 
organised under the National Insurance Administration (NIA). The maximum period of benefits 
is one year, including the employer period. NIA expenses are covered jointly by wage earners’ 
income taxes and employers’ payroll taxes. 
Our data source is the KIRUT database (a Norwegian acronym) containing detailed 
individual information on socio-economic background, labour market participation, and social 
insurance payments for the period 1989-1996 for a random 10% sample of the Norwegian 
population aged 16-67. All data come from public registers. No survey information is 
included. Notably, KIRUT contains individual level information on sickness payments from 
                                                                                                                                                         
1 Currently 1 EURO » 8NOK.   5
the NIA with exact dates for the beginning and end of each sickness spell. There is, however, 
no information about absences during the employer period, which for the period under 
investigation covered the 14 first days of a sickness absence period. 
The sample used in this paper consists of individuals in KIRUT who were recorded in 
the employers' register for at least one calendar year in the period 1990-95, except those 
employed by the central government.
2 Employers are obliged to report to this register all new 
employees who are expected to stay in the job for at least three days, and they must also 
report the termination of an employment period. Although this sampling scheme excludes 
some workers with marginal attachment to the labour market, this number of excluded 
workers is so small that there is no reason why our sample should not give a fair 
representation of  the labour force in this period. The years 1989 and 1996 were excluded 
because of incomplete absence records these years.  
With the exception of the sickness insurance and employment records, the variables 
are recorded on an annual basis. From the sample we constructed a six-year unbalanced panel. 
It is unbalanced because an individual is only included in year t if s/he is recorded in the 
employers’ register throughout that year. The full sample consists of 170 471 individuals aged 
16-66 (born 1924-1979). In the estimations we confine the sample to workers aged 30-55 in 
year t. The motivation for excluding younger and older workers is due to our objective of 
investigating whether marginal workers drive absence changes over the business cycle, the 
labour force composition hypothesis. Then we do not want to include workers who are 
moving into or out of the labour force due to life cycle phenomena. After missing-information 
exclusions, this leaves us with a full sample including 96 892 individuals with 400 094 
person-year observations. We also constructed a restricted sample consisting only of those 
                                                                                                                                                         
 
2 State employees must be excluded because NIA does not register sickness absence on an individual basis. 
Individuals employed by the municipal or country authorities are included, however.   6
who were present in the employers' register for all the six years. As noted in the introduction: 
if the alleged effect of unemployment is driven by labour force composition only, the effect 
should go away, or at least be smaller in this "stable worker" sample than in the full sample. 
Because we are using panel data we did not construct a “marginal workers” sample – they are 
typically present for only one or two years.  
The data from KIRUT do not include information about unemployment rates and were 
therefore merged with county unemployment rates from the Directorate of Labour. Counties 
represent a relevant local labour market since it is possible to commute on a daily basis within 
most counties.  
 (Figure 1 about here) 
We proceed with some aggregate evidence on the development of absence over time. 
Figure 1 shows monthly inflow rates for the full sample together with monthly unemployment 
rates (county averages). The inflow rates were constructed by dividing the number of new 
spells each month by the number of individuals present in the employers’ register throughout 
the year. Both variables have been adjusted for seasonal variation by regression on monthly 
dummies. The curves suggest a negative correlation between the two rates but with the 
absence rates lagging somewhat behind the unemployment peak. From mid-1993, however, 
there seems to be a positive trend in the absence rates.  
  (Figure 2 and 3 about here) 
In Figure 2 we have plotted monthly stocks, i.e. the total number of ongoing sickness 
spells, defined as rates, and Figure 3 shows monthly numbers of sickness days per employee. 
The resulting patterns are similar to Figure 1 but with the upward trend in absences starting 
somewhat later. This may suggest that the seemingly negative connection between sickness 
absences and unemployment is due to increased inflow rates to a larger extent than to   7
increased durations. Finally, Figure 4 shows new sickness spells aggregated on a yearly basis 
as they will be in the regression analysis. The tendency is the same as in the previous figures. 
(Figure 4 about here) 
Bearing in mind that short time absence, which presumably is most responsive to 
economic incentives, is not included here, it is somewhat remarkable that the negative 
correlation between sickness absence and unemployment comes out as clearly as it seemingly 
does. The figures provide only eyeball evidence, however. Moreover, a potential explanation 
could be changes in the labour force composition and that the pattern suggested by the figures 
goes away when controlling for individual characteristics. To investigate whether that is the 
case, the next section provides a panel analysis at the individual level. Before that, we turn to 
sample characteristics. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Table 1 shows the distribution of yearly sickness spells in the sample covering 
individuals aged 30-55. We have defined a sickness spell as belonging to year t if the spell 
started that year. This definition is consistent with inflow at the aggregate level. We note that 
the majority of the sampled individuals have no sickness spells in the six years period, and 
that there is an overweight of women among those who have. Furthermore, there are very few 
individuals with more than two absences in a given year.  
(Table 2 about here) 
In Table 2, we report sample characteristics of variables that will be used in the 
econometric models. The explanatory variables include yearly income, experience, and family 
variables, in addition to the county specific unemployment rates. To avoid endogeneity 
problems, we use lagged values of the income variables. For more precise definitions, see 
Table A1. We note that females are slightly less educated than men, have shorter experience 
and are more prone to work part-time. We also find that women have more absence days than   8
men, where the number of absence days is the sum of all sickness days from sickness spells 
lasting more than two weeks given that these spells start in year t.  This gender difference is 
present when including zero absence (consistent with Table 1) and for positive absences, 
indicating that females have longer as well as more frequent sickness spells (see also 
Mastekaasa and Olsen (1998)). Finally, as expected, we also find that average absence days 
are fewer in the sample that is restricted to the “stable workers” who are present in the 
employers’ register for all six years.
3  
 
3. Empirical specification 
When analysing sickness absence it is natural to distinguish between incidence and duration. 
At the individual level this means differentiating between the probability of being absent and 
the expected duration of absence, once absent. We use reduced form models and do not 
formalise any underlying utility maximising structure here. Such models may be found in e.g. 
Allen (1981).
4 
The discrete outcome variable indicates whether an individual had at least one absence 
spell starting in year t.
5 Accordingly, the duration variable is defined as (the log of) the 
number of calendar days for spells starting in year t. Hence, the definitions are, 
                                                 
3 We refer to Table A2 for descriptive statistics covering the part of the sample that is used in the fixed effect 
logit regressions. 
 
4 Typically such models augment the standard neo-classical labour supply model by making utility health 
dependent and introducing a penalty function in the budget constraint, where the penalty function is increasing in 
absence and also in the unemployment rate. Thus there is a disciplining effect of unemployment on absence. In 
accordance with efficiency wage theory, one may also make the penalty increasing in the wage rate. Then the 
effect of the wage rate on absence is indeterminate, even if sick pay gives full wage compensation and absence is 
a normal good. 
5 We could also have chosen to define the discrete outcome variable indicating whether the individual was absent 
sometime during year t. We have, however, chosen to define the discrete variable based on whether s/he has at 
least one absence spell starting in year t because it fits best with raw data, and as such the definition of absence is 
consistent with inflow at the aggregate level. 
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• Yit = 1 if individual i has at least one sickness absence period starting in year t, 0 otherwise 
• Dit = the duration of all sickness spells starting in year t. 
 
Note that Dit may be the sum of several spells lasting more than two weeks. 
Starting with the model describing the probability of being absent, we denote 
individual  i’s propensity of sickness absence in period  t by  Yit* and propose an error 
component model  
 
(1)  it i it it it U X Y e m d b + + + = ' * . 
 
where b and d are coefficients, Xit is a vector of observable characteristics, mi is an individual 
specific effect,  Uit denotes the unemployment rate,  and  eit is white noise. The vector of 
explanatory variables Xit includes factors that affect the cost of absence and the marginal 
utility of leisure. Finally, the individual specific effect mi picks up the effect of all unobserved 
individual characteristics, in particular health. Clearly, an individual’s health condition affects 
sickness absence. Our sample does, however, not include any information about health. Using 
panel data methods to control for unobserved characteristics alleviates this problem.    
Yit* is unobservable. Instead we define an indicator variable which measures whether 
individual i was absent in period t or not,  ) 0 * ( 1 > = it it Y Y . Equation (1) may then be estimated 
with a panel discrete choice model. We use the fixed effect (conditional) logit estimator, 
which differences out  mi. As already pointed out, our panel allows us to control for 
unobserved individual characteristics. We have chosen to use the fixed effect logit model 
since a random effect model would rest on the implausible assumption that all the explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with individual specific effects. This is especially problematic since   10
the unobserved characteristics include health. Notably, there is evidence that health is 
correlated with socio-economic factors (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000). One drawback of 
the conditional logit estimator is that the conditioning is on the individual means of Yit, and 
only individuals who change status at least once are used in the estimation. This may reduce 
the estimating sample dramatically. On the other hand, those individuals that actually change 
state at least once, are the ones who actually are affected by the explanatory variables.
6  
The length of a sickness absence, the number of absence days in period t, is modelled 
as 
 
(2)  it i it it it U X D u h q g + + + = ' log , 
 
with obvious notation. Clearly, (2) may only be estimated conditional on Yit = 1. We estimate 
this equation using the standard linear within groups estimator.
7 The regressions on log 
duration are conditional on  Yit = 1 and therefore utilise fewer person-year observations than 
the conditional logit estimations. However, an individual who is present in the sample for, 
say, 2 years and has sickness spells each year will be included. Consequently, the number of 
individuals present in these regressions may be (and actually is) larger than in the logit 
estimations. 
 
                                                 
6 Table A2 in the appendix shows sample characteristics for the estimating samples. 
7 We do not perform any correction for sample truncation. Obviously inference is conditional on the truncated 
sample and the results cannot be interpreted in terms of the expected duration for a random individual in the 
population.   11
4. Regression results 
In this section we report results from estimating equation (1) by fixed effect logit and equation 
(2) by the linear fixed effects estimator.
8 Due to the differences revealed by the descriptive 
statistics, the regressions are performed by gender.  
  (Table 3 about here) 
Table 3 reports the fixed effect logit results. Our main focus is, of course, on the effect 
of the unemployment rate. The upper panel shows that after having controlled for observable 
individual characteristics and the unobserved fixed effects, there is still a negative effect of 
the county unemployment rate (but only significant at the 10% level for males). In the lower 
panel, where the sample is restricted to workers who clearly are outside the “marginal 
worker” definition, the negative effect of unemployment remains. In fact, it increases and is 
more precisely estimated. Of course, this does not mean that the excluded group is less prone 
to be absent – Tables 1 and 2 show clearly that the opposite is true. It does, however, indicate 
that variations in the probability of a sickness absence are not driven by changes in the 
composition of the labour force. 
Turning to the other results, we find that for most of the explanatory variables there 
are only minor differences between the results in the upper and lower panels of Table 3. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there is a negative effect of age on the probability of absence. For 
women, from the second order term, the effect becomes positive at about 45 years of age 
(upper panel). The effects of experience and tenure, on the other hand, are positive for men, 
and insignificant for women. This could be explained by a larger degree of job security for 
experienced workers, given their age.
9 Income increases the probability of absence, with a 
                                                 
8 We have also estimated count data models with results qualitatively similar to the logit results reported below. 
Estimating equation (1) with a linear probability model also gave quite similar results in terms of signs and 
statistical significance. 
9 This interpretation is consistent with Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001) who, using German GSOEP data, find that 
absence increases after probation periods.   12
stronger effect for females than for males. If income variation is caused mainly by variation in 
the wage rate, this is opposite to what efficiency wages theory would predict: that high-wage 
workers should have less absence because the cost of a potential job loss is greater. However, 
if there is no such potential “penalty”, the sign could be explained as an income effect if time 
spent absent is a normal good. This is consistent with the concavity of the effect – recall that 
there is a maximum sick pay level which accords to about NOK 240 000 per year. Above that 
level, there is a substitution effect because absence is costly. In fact, the turning point is at 
NOK 295 000 for males (upper panel)  – above that, the income effect is negative. An 
alternative, or supplementary, explanation could be that if high income up to some level is 
caused mainly by working longer hours, the effect could follow from strain. This is consistent 
with part time workers, mostly females, having a lower absence probability. We also note that 
the group of divorced and separated individuals have an increased risk of absence, and that 
there are no significant effects of spouse income and the number of small children, even for 
women.  
(Table 4 about here) 
Table 4 shows the results from estimating linear fixed effects models for the number 
of absence days, equation (2).
10 The results were obtained after dropping variables that did not 
reach 5% statistical significance. In interpretation, one should be aware that the large constant 
term (the average fixed effect) means that the model explains only a small part of the 
observed absences. The remaining effects are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. 
However, there is no statistical significant effect of the unemployment rate for the full sample, 
though the signs are still negative. But again, in the restricted sample the effect of 
unemployment effect is significantly negative, and also of relatively high magnitude. 
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Increasing the unemployment rate (measured in %) with one unit leads to a 4.1% reduction in 
the number of absence days for those who were absent. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have investigated the connection between sickness absence and the 
unemployment rate. For this purpose we used a 6 years panel with an estimating sample 
consisting of more than 30 000 individuals with at least one absence record. Using county 
specific unemployment rates as proxies for unemployment in the local labour markets, we 
find a quite clear negative effect of unemployment on the probability of having a sickness 
spell in a given year. When we restricted the sample to only the insiders, those who were in 
the labour force for the full observation period, the effect did not go away but to the contrary 
became clearer. Also for the duration of absence there was a negative effect in the restricted 
sample but the evidence was more mixed. The latter result is not unreasonable, given that 
duration may be more dependent on pure health factors.  
It is a popular idea that procyclical variation in sickness absence is driven by changes 
in the composition of the labour force due to entrance of “marginal” workers in economic 
upturns. When we find that insiders respond to changes in the unemployment in the local 
labour market, this is taken evidence supporting that marginal workers do not explain the 
fluctuation of absences longer than two weeks. “Stable” workers, those who are in the labour 
force for a long period, do change behaviour. We do not claim, however, to have revealed the 
actual mechanisms driving these changes. The efficiency wage hypothesis may seem best 
suited for explaining shorter absences. We cannot rule out that there actually are detrimental 
                                                                                                                                                         
10 The results in Table 4 are not directly interpretable as duration models, because several absences may be 
aggregated for each individual. If there was only one absence spell per year per individual, the results could be 
interpreted as stemming from a lognormal duration model.   14
health effects of economic booms, or that workplace conditions are affected adversely. But we 
think it is important to realise that general policies to reduce sickness absence may be more 
efficient than policies directed towards “marginal” groups. It might be considered a weakness 
of the data that only absences of more than two weeks were available. In our opinion, 
however, this makes the established effect even more striking. 
The results are also interesting for the discussion of an active labour market policy. To 
avoid expulsion and give room for as many as possible to participate in the labour market, 
most European countries have for a long period tried to combat long-term unemployment by 
measures involving labour market training and assistance in finding jobs. The policy is aimed 
at those who become unemployed as well as those who have not succeeded in establishing 
themselves in the labour market. The Norwegian experience in the early 1990-ies, which is 
covered by our sample period, is interesting in this context. A dramatic increase in 
unemployment initiated extensive programmes involving labour market training and several 
other measures to prepare people for returning to work. An objective was to keep people 
engaged in activities that kept skills, human capital and health intact, instead of becoming 
disabled or long term sick, with a danger of leaving the labour force altogether. Furthermore, 
persons with a more loose connection to the labour market, either due to health problems or 
other social conditions, were intentionally attracted to these programmes. One might argue 
that higher absence rates are “costs” necessarily implied by these policies. In our view, the 
results in this paper suggest that this pessimistic view is not necessarily true.   15
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Table 1 Distribution of yearly sickness spells 1990-95 
  Total sample aged 30 - 55 
  All  Logit sample
1 
  Males  Females  Males  Females 
Spells  Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent 
0  187813  89.8  160353  84.0  45691  70.3  57345  67.4 
1  18562  8.9  26019  13.6  16932  26.0  23850  28.0 
2  2536  1.2  4080  2.1  2159  3.3  3548  4.2 
3  268  0.1  406  0.21  221  0.3  334  0.4 
4  29  0.0  25  0.0  15  0.0  21  0.0 
5  1  0.0  2  0.0  1  0.0  2  0.0 
Total  209209  100  190885  100  65019  100  85100  100 
  Restricted sample (present all six years) 
  All  Logit sample
1 
  Males  Females  Males  Females 
Spells  Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent  Freq.  Percent 
0  116618  90.2  95378  84.2  33266  72.8  40442  69.8 
1  11008  8.5  15247  13.5  10855  23.8  15008  25.9 
2  1462  1.1  2365  2.1  1400  3.1  2286  3.9 
3  154  0.1  230  0.2  143  0.3  213  0.4 
4  21  0.0  11  0.0  13  0.0  10  0.0 
5  1  0.0  1  0.0  1  0.0  1  0.0 
Total  129264  100  113232  100  45678  100  57960  100 
1Only individuals with at least two different outcomes are used in the fixed effect logits   18
Table 2 Descriptive statistics. Sample averages 1990-95 for employees aged 30-55. 
  Full sample  Restricted sample 
  Males  Females  Males  Females 
Variable  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev. 
Absence days  8.57  40.30  14.14  51.69  7.09  34.22  12.51  46.18 
Positive abs. days  83.76  97.90  88.41  100.68  72.51  85.03  79.35  90.67 
Age  42.00  6.85  42.62  6.81  42.59  5.77  43.32  5.71 
Education
1  11.41  2.57  10.75  2.27  11.32  2.52  10.59  2.15 
Experience  19.77  5.55  15.01  5.65  20.82  4.90  16.10  5.49 
Tenure  6.89  5.43  6.00  4.63  7.83  5.56  7.00  4.82 
Income  27.75  13.20  16.05  7.06  28.36  12.05  16.62  6.77 
Spouse income  9.52  10.94  19.63  21.84  9.88  11.69  19.90  21.45 
Part time  0.02  0.14  0.22  0.42  0.01  0.10  0.20  0.40 
Unmarried  0.17  0.38  0.12  0.33  0.14  0.35  0.11  0.31 
Married  0.71  0.45  0.71  0.45  0.74  0.44  0.72  0.45 
Prevmar  0.12  0.32  0.16  0.37  0.11  0.32  0.17  0.37 
Kids < 11  0.54  0.88  0.42  0.75  0.53  0.86  0.31  0.64 
Unemployment  4.94  0.92  4.97  0.91  4.94  0.92  4.96  0.91 
Observations  209209  190885  129264  113232 
Individuals  50141  46751  21544  18872 
1Years of education. Not used in the regressions.  19
Table 3 Fixed effect logit results. 1990-95 panel of employees aged 30-55 
  Full sample 
          All         Males           Females 
  Coef.  St. err.  P>z  Coef. St. err.  P>z  Coef. St. err.  P>z 
Age  -0.246  0.055  0.000  -0.579  0.133  0.000  -0.179  0.063  0.005 
Age
2  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.007  0.002  0.000  0.000 
Experience  0.090  0.050  0.071  0.469  0.129  0.000  -0.019  0.055  0.731 
Tenure  0.006  0.003  0.047  0.012  0.004  0.009  0.002  0.005  0.628 
Income  0.073  0.004  0.000  0.059  0.007  0.000  0.090  0.007  0.000 
Income
2  -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000 
Spouse income  0.002  0.001  0.053  0.001  0.003  0.861  0.002  0.001  0.066 
Part time  -0.249  0.063  0.000  -0.264  0.167  0.115  -0.241  0.068  0.000 
Married  0.102  0.099  0.302  0.070  0.138  0.614  0.154  0.145  0.291 
Prevmar  0.348  0.107  0.001  0.343  0.150  0.022  0.374  0.155  0.016 
Kids < 11  0.006  0.020  0.762  -0.010  0.029  0.728  0.034  0.028  0.234 
Unemployment  -0.032  0.011  0.003  -0.030  0.016  0.071  -0.037  0.014  0.010 
Log likelihood  -55201  -23525  -31653 
Individuals  30078  12940  17138 
Observations  150119  65019  85100 
  Restricted sample (present in all 6 years) 
           All       Males           Females 
  Coef.  St. err.  P>z  Coef. St. err.  P>z  Coef. St. err.  P>z 
Age  -0.308  0.081  0.000  -0.793  0.237  0.001  -0.227  0.091  0.013 
Age
2  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.012  0.002  0.000  0.000 
Experience  0.155  0.076  0.042  0.668  0.235  0.004  0.043  0.082  0.603 
Tenure  0.005  0.004  0.152  0.011  0.005  0.031  1.9E-04  0.005  0.972 
Income  0.083  0.006  0.000  0.071  0.010  0.000  0.106  0.010  0.000 
Income
2  -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.000 
Spouse income  0.003  0.001  0.031  0.004  0.004  0.249  0.003  0.002  0.095 
Part time  -0.333  0.090  0.000  -0.555  0.276  0.044  -0.301  0.096  0.002 
Married  0.104  0.134  0.440  -0.076  0.181  0.673  0.318  0.204  0.120 
Prevmar  0.350  0.143  0.014  0.147  0.194  0.449  0.581  0.215  0.007 
Kids < 11  0.028  0.025  0.263  0.022  0.034  0.513  0.047  0.037  0.206 
Unemployment  -0.049  0.013  0.000  -0.048  0.020  0.015  -0.051  0.018  0.004 
Log likelihood  -38169  -16480  -21671 
Individuals  17273  7613  9660 
Observations  103638  45678  57960 
Dependent variable = 1 if at least one NIA absence record starting in year t   20
Table 4 Days absent. Linear fixed effect results. 1990-95 panel of employees aged 30-55 
  Full sample 
       All         Males         Females 
  Coef.  St. err.  P>t  Coef.  St. err.  P>t  Coef.  St. err.  P>t 
Age  -0.218  0.082  0.008  -0.211  0.174  0.226  -0.207  0.095  0.029 
Age
2  0.001  0.000  0.005  0.001  0.001  0.051  0.001  0.000  0.061 
Experience  0.196  0.078  0.012  0.178  0.171  0.300  0.195  0.088  0.027 
Tenure  0.009  0.004  0.012  0.003  0.005  0.616  0.014  0.005  0.004 
Income  0.045  0.006  0.000  0.034  0.010  0.000  0.054  0.010  0.000 
Income
2  -0.001  1.2E-04  0.000  -4.1E-04  1.5E-04  0.008  -0.001  0.000  0.005 
Kids < 11  0.013  0.022  0.567  -0.039  0.032  0.222  0.065  0.031  0.038 
Unemployment  -0.019  0.012  0.112  -0.022  0.019  0.239  -0.017  0.015  0.275 
Constant  7.600  2.077  0.000  6.919  3.882  0.075  7.766  2.580  0.003 
Individuals  33213  14310  18903 
Observations  51928  21396  30532 
  Restricted sample (present in all 6 years) 
       All         Males          Females 
  Coef.  St. err.  P>t  Coef.  St. err.  P>t  Coef.  St. err.  P>t 
Age  -0.305  0.121  0.012  -1.005  0.323  0.002  -0.204  0.132  0.122 
Age
2  0.001  0.000  0.035  0.000  0.001  0.635  0.001  0.000  0.037 
Experience  0.279  0.117  0.017  1.023  0.320  0.001  0.158  0.126  0.209 
Tenure  0.002  0.004  0.590  -0.005  0.006  0.409  0.008  0.005  0.126 
Income  0.053  0.008  0.000  0.037  0.014  0.008  0.065  0.013  0.000 
Income
2  -0.001  1.6E-04  0.000  -4.7E-04  2.2E-04  0.037  -0.001  0.000  0.005 
Kids < 11  0.002  0.026  0.946  -0.068  0.036  0.064  0.070  0.037  0.058 
Unemployment  -0.041  0.014  0.002  -0.046  0.022  0.032  -0.037  0.018  0.033 
Constant  9.892  2.999  0.001  24.184  6.965  0.001  7.636  3.572  0.033 
Individuals  17368  7652  9716 
Observations  30500  12646  17854 
Dependent variable = log(calendar days absent in year t) 
Estimates conditional on at least 1 absence period paid by NIA in year t 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4  Yearly new sickness spells and unemployment   23
Appendix 
Table A1  Variable definitions. All measurements as of year t, t = 1990,.., 1995 
Variable  Definition 
Absence days  Sickness absence (calendar) days paid by NIA starting in year t 
Age  Age in year t 
Experience  Years with income above 1G, where G is basic counting unit in pension 
system (NOK 39 230 in 1995) 
Tenure  Years with current employer 
Income  Gross taxable income in 10 000s 1995 NOK  (lagged one year in the 
regressions) 
Spouse income  Gross taxable income of spouse in 10 000s 1995 NOK (lagged one year 
in the regressions) 
Part time  Dummy indicating working less than 20 hours/week 
Unmarried  Dummy indicating individual is not married (reference in regressions) 
Married  Dummy indicating individual is married  
Prevmar  Dummy indicating individual is separated, divorced or widow(er) 
Kids < 11  Number of children less than 11 years of age 
Unemployment  Average % county unemployment (Directorate of Labour, based on 
register unemployment) 
 
   24
Table A2  Descriptive statistics for the fixed effext logit samples. Averages 1990-95 
  Full sample  Restricted sample 
         Males          Females        Males       Females 
Variable  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev. 
Absence days  24.02  63.81  27.95  69.04  19.68  54.88  24.00  61.90 
Positive abs. days  80.80  95.44  85.68  98.32  72.41  85.25  79.41  90.97 
Age  42.81  6.60  43.12  6.58  42.98  5.82  43.49  5.77 
Education
1  10.60  2.25  10.49  2.19  10.55  2.20  10.38  2.10 
Experience  20.85  5.06  15.43  5.48  21.46  4.65  16.13  5.37 
Tenure  7.49  5.54  6.30  4.66  8.19  5.61  6.99  4.78 
Income  24.84  9.26  16.10  6.31  25.11  8.82  16.40  6.16 
Spouse income  8.86  8.62  18.53  15.11  9.08  8.60  18.61  14.86 
Part time  0.02  0.13  0.21  0.41  0.01  0.10  0.19  0.40 
Unmarried  0.16  0.37  0.11  0.31  0.14  0.35  0.10  0.30 
Married  0.69  0.46  0.69  0.46  0.71  0.45  0.70  0.46 
Prevmar  0.15  0.35  0.19  0.40  0.14  0.35  0.20  0.40 
Kids < 11  0.46  0.83  0.38  0.72  0.45  0.81  0.30  0.64 
Unemploy-ment  4.99  0.91  5.00  0.90  4.98  0.91  4.98  0.91 
Observations  65 019  85 100  45 678  57 960 
Individuals  12 940  17 138  7613  9660 
1Years of education. Not used in the regressions. 
Only individuals with at least one change in absence status are included in the logit samples. 
 
 
 